Strong defence and national resilience are absolute priorities for the Baltic states in 2026. Geopolitical turbulence, Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine, and diminishing US leadership in Europe are driving efforts to strengthen national capabilities, deepen societal involvement in security and defence, and enhance regional co-operation. Prevailing uncertainty is testing their strategic judgement, internal cohesion, and the ability to adapt.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has reached an inflection point. Its three pathways to victory – on the battlefield, through terrorising civilians with missile and drone attacks, and via Donald Trump – have not produced the desired results. Ukraine continues to resist and strike Russia with increasing range and effectiveness. Europe maintains steady support even without the US. Donald Trump, having failed to force Ukraine into capitulation, has withdrawn from the peacemaker role – perhaps for the better.
As tensions within Russia’s regime, economy, and society mount, Putin is searching for new victims – targets Moscow perceives as vulnerable and exposed, offering an opportunity to restore the image of a powerful and victorious Russia. Many intelligence services warn that, as the regime loses footing in Ukraine, it may lash out elsewhere. Russia has already intensified its state-sponsored terrorism campaign across Europe and increased pressure on the Baltic states. The Kremlin resembles a serial killer: it has motive and means, and only needs opportunity. The Baltic region appears to be one of the directions it is preparing to exploit should such an opportunity emerge.
This danger may materialise sooner than many expect due to the US retreat from Europe and its weakened commitment to European defence, the rise of far-right political forces in key European states, and the fact that Europe’s rearmament is only beginning to gain momentum. The task facing the Baltics and their allies is clear: to convince the Kremlin that poking the Baltics or any NATO member would be a high-risk undertaking with catastrophic consequences for Russia itself.
Many elements of this effort are already underway. Allied presence is expanding, with the German brigade set to establish itself in Lithuania from 2027. NATO’s regional defence plans are in place and regularly exercised. Additional formations are being assigned to the region, with the German-Dutch Corps assuming responsibility for Latvia’s and Estonia’s defence alongside the Multinational Corps North East, which remains responsible for Lithuania. National armed forces, voluntary defence organisations, and innovative defence-industrial ecosystems are all expanding rapidly, supported by defence spending exceeding 5% of GDP in all three Baltic states.
Yet concerns remain about whether current efforts adequately reflect the scale and urgency of the challenge. Effective defences against cheap but deadly drones are lagging. The mass “dronisation” of armed forces still faces entrenched NATO and national doctrines and conservative military mindsets. Long-range strike capabilities face supply shortages, particularly as the US delays deliveries due to its war against Iran. Border fortification under the Baltic Defence Line is progressing too slowly. Universal conscription of the kind practised by Israel remains politically sensitive despite its strategic logic. Most importantly, the quality of political decision-making has eroded, with governing coalitions often struggling with competence, integrity, and public trust issues. Some allies still behave as though they can afford to ignore, or merely pay lip service to, a security crisis engineered by Moscow in the Baltic region.
None of this means a Russian attack – especially a limited or hybrid one – is inevitable or destined to succeed. We know Moscow’s methods. Baltic intelligence and security services remain vigilant and capable, making early warning and prevention or even pre-emption possible. Allies across the region and beyond are prepared to assist if necessary. Baltic armed forces are also far stronger than they were in 2014, when Russia launched its war against Ukraine.
Moscow can be deterred and, as Ukrainians have demonstrated, it can also be defeated on the battlefield if it comes to that. Success will depend on whether the Baltics and the rest of Europe move forward with sufficient speed, unity, and determination – both in continuing their support to Ukraine and delivering on their own total and collective defence concepts and commitments.
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